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CUSTOM, ADJUDICATION, AND PETRUSHEVSKY'S
WATCH: SOME NOTES FROM THE INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY FRONT
Stephen L. Carter*
T HE Russian absurdist writer Daniil Kharms told the following
X story about Pushkin:
Once Petrushevsky broke his watch and sent for Pushkin. Pushkin
came, looked at Petrushevsky's watch, and put it back on the chair.
"What do you say, Brother Pushkin?" Petrushevsky asked. "The
wheels stopped going round," Pushkin said.1
I sometimes share this story with my students in Contracts when we
talk about the ability of courts to stand outside of an industry and to
figure out what the custom of dealing is in order to imply terms in a
contract. The courts, I explain, might be able to tell whether the
wheels are turning, but I am not sure that they can tell why or why
not.
The same story comes to mind when Richard Epstein suggests that
the famous case of International News Service v. Associated Press
2
("INS") was correctly decided if and only if the United States
Supreme Court correctly understood the newspaper industry's norms
on property rights in the news.3 In INS, the defendant, the Interna-
tional News Service, having been cut off for political reasons from
gathering war news directly, copied news bulletins posted by its com-
petitor, the Associated Press, which brought suit. The Supreme
Court's opinion ruling for the plaintiff was short and to the point:
"The transaction speaks for itself," wrote Justice Mahlon Pitney,
"and a court of equity ought not to hesitate long in characterizing it
as unfair competition in business."
4
* William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Yale University. I am grateful to Bob
Ellickson for many helpful suggestions.
I Daniil Kharms, Anecdotes About Pushkin's Life, in Russia's Lost Literature of the
Absurd 66, 66 (George Gibian ed., trans., 1971).
2 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
3 See Richard A. Epstein, International News Service v. Associated Press: Custom and Law
as Sources of Property Rights in News, 78 Va. L. Rev. 85 (1992).
4 INS, 248 U.S. at 240.
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According to Epstein's theory, however, the case involved less a
matter of unfair competition than a matter of theft. The International
News Service's wrong, says Epstein, was its violation of an industry
custom holding that one provider will not copy another's news.'
When a stable custom on property boundaries has evolved over repeat
plays in an industry, Epstein argues, the Court should enforce that
custom as law.6 I will refer to such a custom as the "local property
rules," to capture Epstein's suggestion that there is more here than
the work of informal norms; for what Epstein has in mind is using the
power of the state to coerce parties to continue to operate according
to evolved understandings of an industry. Instead of criticizing
Epstein's idea, in this brief Comment I raise some puzzles and
problems that come to mind, with special reference to intellectual
property law, my own field of endeavor.
There is nothing unusual in calling upon the courts to ascertain
industry practices. Investigation of custom has long been central to
adjudicating disputes between private parties; as I have already men-
tioned, it is virtually a staple of contract law. Moreover, it is useful to
be reminded from time to time that in the absence of regulation, par-
ties will frequently work out a series of practices that are, as between
them, efficient (which I use here in the sense of welfare-maximizing).
One can call to mind a fairly substantial set of cases in which this is
likely, particularly those regarding exchange of tangible goods or
marking off the borders of real property.
Intellectual property cases are rarely thought of as being a part of
the set, however, because the public goods problem is thought to be
too dominant. When the next user can appropriate the fruit of intel-
lectual development at a cost close to zero and without interfering
with the prior user's enjoyment, it is not easy to see what suasion the
prior user can bring to bear, in the absence of regulation, to make the
next user stop. What one expects instead is that in the absence of
regulation, the intangible goods involved will be underproduced.
7
To the extent that Epstein's article is descriptive, one can hardly
quarrel with its conclusion, for many industries have indeed evolved
elaborate norms for deciding what counts as property and what
5 See Epstein, supra note 3, at 94-95, 97-98.
6 See id. at 126.
7 Of course, underproduction is not the inevitable result, as Epstein correctly concedes. See
id. at 97.
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counts as taking, and courts often do enforce these norms as though
they are legally binding property rules. One need only consider the
use of treatments for motion pictures and formal proposals for books.
If what the industry counts as property is taken, a court often will
decide that compensation is due-as the makers of the hit film Com-
ing to America recently learned. To be sure, it is not clear how wide-
spread the application of Epstein's proposal is likely to be, for the
world of intellectual property. is so heavily regulated that there is less
and less space for private ordering to emerge (although, as I will
shortly explain, less space is not the same as no space). Still, whatever
its practical limits, the principle possesses an undeniable appeal.
To the extent that Epstein means his proposal to be prescriptive,
however, he is on shakier ground. One should be careful about insist-
ing that a court always should enforce private customs regarding
property rights, even if they have remained stable over time, or, as
Epstein would have it, across repeat plays. There are many possible
reasons for this caution. First, the private ordering-the evolved cus-
tom-might itself be inefficient. For example, the private ordering
might create negative externalities that the parties to the ordering
should be made to internalize, as would be the case if television news
programs followed a custom of copying all of their news from the
papers. Another good example of an inefficient set of customary
property rules might involve restrictive licensing practices that in
some circumstances might be aimed at cartelization 8
Second, enforcement of the private ordering might interfere with a
larger state policy. An obvious example would be a suit by one drug
dealer against another for intruding on the turf of the first. To take a
third case, the private ordering might actually be immoral. Again, an
obvious example makes the case: one might envision an emergent set
of customs under which black people cannot own property or another
under which women are property. 9 Such risks as these, however, all
can be resolved by the application of various meta-rules to trump
8 One might avoid this by adding a rule, as Epstein implies in his article, that only efficient
orderings should be enforced. If this is the rule, of course, it is no longer the private custom
alone that is doing the work.
9 One might respond that the main principle still holds because rules such as these are also'
inefficientThat objection is rather a frightening one, however, for it implies that an individual
who is not convinced that forced slavery, for example, is less efficient than free sale of labor has
no good reason to oppose it.
1992]
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what one might think of as the local property rules. My more imme-
diate concern is with the problem of Petrushevsky's watch. Even
courts inclined to enforce private orderings might not be very good at
anthropology. The judge, after all, is on the outside, looking in. Even
assuming-and there is no reason to do so-that the parties tell the
whole truth, it will not always be so easy for a court to discern an
industry's customs. In ordinary adjudication, when the law is clear
and what matters is the conduct of the two parties with respect to one
another, it is reasonable to expect that the parties themselves will be
the best sources of evidence, even given the natural tendency of the
lawyers for both sides to distort the facts in ways favorable to their
clients. What Epstein proposes, however, is similar to contracts cases,
for example, in which the adjudicating court is called upon to work
out not only the conduct or custom of the parties with respect to each
other, but the custom of dealing within the industry. Although law-
suits in which industry customs come into question are, of course,
quite common, I have always wondered, during my years of teaching
first-year Contracts, whether the courts really know what they are
talking about-not because the judges lack competence, but because
the further beyond the facts of the case they go, the weaker their
sources of information are likely to be.
Let me put aside, however, the problem of judicial competence to
conduct these anthropological explorations and pursue instead some
speculations on what a judicial investigation of a community's
evolved norms of property-its local property rules-might uncover,
with special reference to intellectual property. For if I were forced to
point to a flaw in Epstein's fascinating article, I would note the
absence of a full discussion of local property regimes that might work
quite differently from the "this-is-mine, this-is-yours" model he
presents.
Imagine, for example, a community that possesses a notion of pri-
vate property but also has a very strong norm against seeking outside
intervention to enforce it. The question of whether one can reason-
ably speak of property rights without a mechanism of enforcement is
a large one, and one that Epstein quite properly addresses in his arti-
cle. What I wonder about is the somewhat smaller question of
whether a community can have a norm that says there will be no
enforcement.
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My colleague Robert Ellickson reports that among cattle ranchers
in Shasta County, California, a very strong norm holds that absent
the most egregious violations of the evolved local property rules, it is
inappropriate to seek state enforcement of one's rights.10 Ranchers
whose cattle do damage are expected to make amends, usually in kind
rather than in cash, and most small damages are left to lie where they
fall.'" If a rancher does not comply with the norms requiring him to
make amends, informal sanctions are applied by the community.'
2
Calling in government to resolve disputes, however, is often seen as a
violation of the rules of good neighborliness.
Sometimes the same norm might emerge for reasons of ideology
rather than neighborliness. Back in the 1960s, this question was
warmly debated within the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Com-
mittee ("SNCC"). One SNCC faction was accused of stealing from
the group. An opposing faction called the police-and was promptly
censured within SNCC for bringing outside authorities into the dis-
pute, or, more precisely, for "calling a racist henchman cop of the
white master.., to settle an internal dispute."' 3 Again, it is not that
SNCC did not believe in private property; it is, rather, that some of its
members sufficiently distrusted the state that they tried to inculcate a
very strong norm against seeking government enforcement of rights.
But one need not stretch quite so far back, for intellectual property
provides more recent examples. Consider the recent case of Lotus
Development Corp. v. Paperback Software International.14 In Lotus,
the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts
adopted a variation of the so-called "look and feel" test, granting
copyright protection for certain aspects of the user interface-the way
the human operates with the software--of Lotus Development Cor-
poration's popular spreadsheet program, LOTUS 1-2-3.1' Many pro-
grammers think that Lotus Development Corporation, in seeking
judicial relief for the copying of aspects of its user interface, went
10 See Robert C. Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes 59-64
(1991).
11 Id. at 53-56.
12 Id. at 56-59.
13 Cleveland Sellers, The River of No Return 186 (1973).
14 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990).
15 For the purposes of this analysis-indeed, for the purposes of this Comment-I do not
address the question of whether the local customary property rules that Epstein exalts should
be held preempted by appropriate federal statutes, like the 1976 Copyright Act.
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outside the local property rules governing what aspects of software
are protectible and what aspects can be freely copied. 16 In fact, the
Lotus result actually provoked a fairly significant public demonstra-
tion at its corporate headquarters-one chanted slogan was "HEY,
HEY, HO, HO, LOOK AND FEEL HAS GOT TO GO"-which is
not, shall we say, the usual response to intellectual property decisions,
even quite controversial ones.
Obviously, Lotus Development Corporation did not think its resort
to judicial process represented a move outside the local property rules
(a defection), although, in Epstein's analysis what matters is not one
party's self-serving opinion on any particular play, but rather the
evolved industry custom over repeat plays. 17 In the software indus-
try, the custom of copying user interfaces has been undeniably wide-
spread and might even be efficient."' If the industry practices are as I
have just described them, Lotus Development Corporation has
defected, not by taking someone else's local property, as the defendant
did in INS, but by seeking government assistance in making property
of what had previously been held in common. One challenge for
Epstein's test, then, is whether, in such a case, he is willing to protect
the local property rules, including the norm against enforcement, by
throwing the suit out of court. A related challenge for Epstein
involves a breaking of local property rules that runs the other way-
when the breach of customary rules involves a denial, rather than a
grant, of access to property, should judicial enforcement be the same?
Consider once more the INS case. In that case, as Epstein points
out, an argument of necessity was available to the International News
Service, the defendant.' 9 Suppose, as Epstein does in his article, that
the International News Service goes to the Associated Press for a
16 If the interface is protectible, other software firms cannot mimic its working, which
means that they must design software that interacts with the user in a different way, which
raises costs of entry because some skills are not then transferable from already existing
software to the new software.
17 See Epstein, supra note 3, at 126.
18 On the possible efficiency of copying of user interfaces, see Stephen L. Carter, Gaining
Without Venturing: The New Section 337 and the New Software Protections, in Technology,
Trade, and World Competition 93, 115-17 (1990).
19 Epstein, supra note 3, at 117-19. We might want to debate whether "necessity" is the
right word when the truth is that one party has made itself obnoxious, as they used to say, to a
foreign state. But let us pass this point and take the necessity as given for the sake of
argument.
[Vol. 78:129
HeinOnline -- 78 Va. L. Rev.  134 1992
Commentary
license. If the Associated Press grants the license, there might be cir-
cumstances in which an antitrust problem would arise, especially if
what seems to be cross-licensing ends up as cartelization.
Suppose, however, that the Associated Press sees the chance for
(temporary) monopoly rents and says no, putting the International
News Service out of business. Would it matter in this case if, along
with the understanding of property rights in news, there was a more
communal understanding of sharing with others in time of necessity?
Note that if this local norm of sharing existed, it would be the Associ-
ated Press that first broke the frame of rights (that is, defected from
the local property rules). In this circumstance, should the Interna-
tional News Service be able to sue the Associated Press for its viola-
tion of the customary property rules on sharing? Presumably, the
answer must be yes; after all, if the goal is to enforce the local prop-
erty rules because the parties most likely have reached efficient cus-
toms, there is no reason to enforce them only when they resemble the
rules that are imposed by positive law.
One can generalize the point. Suppose that A, B, and C are all
farmers in a community with extensive local property rules, including
rules prohibiting theft and rules requiring sharing when another's
crop fails.20 We can assume that the rules have evolved over the
years, through repeat plays, with A, B, and C each sharing when
called upon to help. Then one year A has a bumper crop, but B and C
are both struck by blight. Blight is so widespread that A decides to
take more crops to market that year at a higher price and thus has
fewer crops to share with B and C. B then buys A's remaining crops.
C, who is penniless, now risks starvation--or at least shutdown.
Should C have a cause of action against A (and possibly B) for inter-
fering with its local rights, provided by custom, in A's crop?
Under Epstein's theory, one would assume that the answer is yes,
because all that has changed is the definition of property (that is, the
local rules). But then the case begins to sound more like the flip side
of INS: Suppose that C breaks into A's barn and steals what it needs?
Now C, too, has broken the frame. Is C's defection actionable by A?
Or, to make it more like INS, suppose that C's crop failure has noth-
20 There is no necessary reason to think of this example as involving altruism; the crop-
sharing arrangement, which is analogous to potlatch custom among some Pacific Coast Indian
tribes, might just as accurately be characterized as a form of insurance. See Ellickson, supra
note 10, at 176-77, for a discussion of norms of "charity" in this context.
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ing to do with the quality of what it has grown. Rather, the govern-
ment has shut down C's farm for violations of the Occupational
Safety and Health Act. Now C's crop has "failed" in the sense that C
is not permitted to harvest it. Can C now steal from A?
Here, too, the battle over intellectual property rights in the com-
puter software industry provides a concrete example. The recent case
of Lasercomb America v. Job Reynolds21 raises the question of
whether defecting from the local property rules should, in effect, lead
to loss of one's negative property rights. The Lasercomb facts can be
summarized as follows: Job Reynolds sought a license to use certain
software that was the subject of Lasercomb's copyrights. Lasercomb
declined to license the software except on terms that Job Reynolds
considered outrageous. Instead of taking the license, Job Reynolds
simply copied the software without payment. In Lasercomb's action
for infringement, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit ruled for Job Reynolds, on the ground that Lasercomb's
demand for an "unreasonable" license fee constituted copyright
misuse.22
Lasercomb is, in many ways, a troubling case, but only, I think, if
one has a view of property that is limited to negative property
rights-rights of exclusion. Local customary rules, however, can
instead be positive-rights of access. Suppose that the Lasercomb
outcome rests on the court's understanding of the local property rules
of the software industry and that among the local rules is one requir-
ing all players to grant licenses on reasonable terms, terms no harsher
than some optimal term X. A now seeks to use its copyright lever,
which grants it exclusive control over the software in issue, to impose
term Y instead. If Y violates the local rules (that is, if Y is harsher
than X), however, then one who is interested in enforcing the local
21 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990).
22 Id. at 979. The doctrine of copyright misuse, which is by no means universally accepted
by courts or by commentators, is modeled on the better established doctrine of patent misuse,
under which a patent holder faces the loss of some of its rights if it makes certain
anticompetitive uses of its patent. The patent misuse doctrine, like the copyright misuse
doctrine, is essentially judge-made law and originated in the late nineteenth century, during an
era of judicial hostility to the monopoly that patents were said to convey. Congress, in the
Patent Misuse Reform Act of 1988, 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (1988), has restricted the availability of
the patent misuse defense, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
although denying that it has done so, has essentially limited the doctrine to situations in which
the actions of the patentee would amount to violations of federal antitrust law.
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rules would presumably hold that A's violation of emergent custom-
ary norms provides a defense for B--essentially the Lasercomb result.
Unless one has a previous bias in favor of forms of property that are
traditionally recognized in our law (and because we are, by hypothe-
sis, rejecting the labor theory of property23), there is no particular
reason that we should reject local rules giving more than one person a
claim on what one alone has created through labor, whether the Asso-
ciated Press's news, farmer A's produce, Lotus' user interfaces, or
Lasercomb's software.
These challenges are, I think, important ones, and I hope that
Epstein will take them up as he develops his theory further. They do
not, of course, invalidate his theory, and his theory does, as I have
said, possess an undeniable appeal. Still, it is interesting to note that
there are important judicial precedents, especially in copyright, that
arguably stand at variance with Epstein's approach because they seem
to ignore, or even to devastate, regimes of local informal rules. For
example, when the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, in Salinger v. Random House,24 held that a biographer's
extensive quotations from unpublished copyrighted letters of the sub-
ject constituted copyright infringement, the decision shook the pub-
lishing industry.25 Perhaps one reason that the industry was so
shaken was that an implicit understanding-the local property
rules-had been overturned by force majeure.26
Equally interesting is the Supreme Court's recent decision in Feist
Publications v. Rural Telephone Service Co.,27 handed down after
Epstein completed his article. In Feist, the justices decided that
alphabetized white page listings in a telephone directory lack original-
ity and that (depending on how one reads Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor's opinion for the Court), either the white page listings are
not copyrightable or copying all the information that they contain, in
23 See Epstein, supra note 3, at 108. For the classic articulation of the labor theory, see
John Locke, Two Treatises of Government 133-46 (Thomas I. Cook ed., 1947) (6th ed. 1764).
24 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir.), reh'g denied, 818 F.2d 252 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 890
(1987).
25 One editor at a commercial publishing house has suggested to me that, for safety's sake, it
is now best for authors not to quote any unpublished letters to or from anybody.
26 The court's only attention to industry practice was an oblique one, in its suggestion that
authors might, in the future, use paraphrases to report facts rather than quotes containing
"expressive content." Salinger, 811 F.2d at 100.
27 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991).
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the same order, is not infringement. In either case, the Court's route
to its conclusion was the unequivocal rejection of what has come to be
called the "sweat-of-the-brow" rule-the understanding that copy-
right law rewards the author for the labor and effort that produced
the work.28 Copyright law, said Justice O'Connor, rewards only orig-
inality;2 9 consequently, if a work is not original, the fact that the
author has put lots of effort into it will not, in Judge Benjamin
Kaplan's fine phrase, "make the copyright turnstile revolve."
'3 0
As it happens, I think Feist was rightly decided and that the sweat-
of-the-brow rule was never anything but wretched law. At the same
time, it is worth being alert to the possibility that the sweat-of-the-
brow rule rested on a judicial understanding of local property rules
across a variety of industries. Perhaps there are widespread norms
holding it inappropriate to copy the work of one who has put a great
deal of effort into it, without regard to the vagaries of federal intellec-
tual property law.
This last point is worth emphasizing. I suspect that local property
rules have evolved just about everywhere where there is no regulation
and in quite a few places where there is. But not all local property
rights will be enforceable in the same way and not all will be enforcea-
ble at low cost; on the other hand, many local property rights will be
enforced without resort to law. This is less likely in the field of intel-
lectual property, for the public goods reasons that I previously men-
tioned.31 One would predict that the public goods problem would
make defections more likely in the realm of intellectual endeavor and
that local rules are therefore less likely to survive. Consequently,
despite Richard Epstein's entreaties, it should scarcely come as a sur-
prise when the courts upset local rules governing intellectual
property.
But even if local rules governing intellectual property are less likely
than others to survive, they will sometimes turn out to be fairly sta-
ble-generally, one would predict, when there is a stronger sanction
than tit-for-tat available to use against defectors. For example, one
may think of the development of chess knowledge (the best move in
28 Id. at 1295 (holding that "originality, not 'sweat of the brow,' is the touchstone of
copyright protection" in fact-based works).
29 Id. at 1289-90.
30 Benjamin Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright 46 (1966).
31 See supra text accompanying note 7.
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particular situations) as a species of intellectual property, even though
it does not fall cleanly within the major headings of copyright or pat-
ent. The field of chess writing, it turns out, does have informal norms
that might be thought of as local property rules, and they govern prin-
cipally the matter of citation. Basically, a theorist is expected to
acknowledge the giants on whose shoulders key bits of analysis rest:
"Richard Epstein was the first to develop this brilliant line of play,"
the analyst must write; or "This analysis is based on a masterful sug-
gestion by Lloyd Weinreb." Obviously, there is no formal sanction
available should an analyst violate these rules, but the informal sanc-
tions of peer (and consumer) disapproval can severely damage one's
reputation and hence one's career, much as evidence of plagiarism can
severely damage an academic career.
Along the same line, my colleague Bob Ellickson argues that the
informal norms governing citation and copying in academia might
amount to such local property rules, existing, as it were, in the inter-
stices of copyright. 2 According to Ellickson, it is widely understood
among writers in academic journals that others will reproduce their
work for classroom use without permission (even in excess of the
amount allowed under the self-proclaimed "guidelines" that appear in
the legislative history of section 107 of the 1976 Copyright Act 33), and
that they may do the same. That this amounts to a zero-price license
is not a problem, says Ellickson, because the rewards for successful
academic publishing are found not in royalties but in promotion,
higher salary, and enhanced status.34 Although I am not sure
whether a court, in analyzing a "fair use" defense to a claim of
infringement, would consider itself bound by the local rules that
Ellickson describes, his explanation has the virtue of making sense of
the informal advice that I and many others who teach copyright law
have been giving worried colleagues for years.
32 Ellickson, supra note 10, at 258-64. Ellickson prefers the term "norm" to refer to
informal understandings of the sort that I have been describing, but my preference for "rule,"
as I have explained, rests on Epstein's vision of the understandings as binding and enforceable
rights in property. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
33 See H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66-72 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5679-5686; see also H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1733, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 72
(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5810, 5813 (endorsing the House Report).
34 Ellickson excepts commercially published works from his theory, on the ground that the
publishers have a financial stake in the production of copies. See Ellickson, supra note 10, at
262-63.
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Moreover, a similar idea might help unpack one of the enduring
puzzles of the fair use exception to copyright: Why it is that reviewers
should have a privilege to quote liberally from the works they criti-
cize, even when writing harsh and unfavorable reviews? William
Landes and Richard Posner, in their thoughtful article on the eco-
nomics of copyright, suggest that the privilege of critics to quote from
the works they criticize might be traced to a sort of hypothetical con-
tract within the community of writers and critics, under which the
quotation is permitted because the writers are better off in the long
run.35 Perhaps a better model is not contract but property; perhaps
there is a local property rule under which the rights of authors do not
extend to the prevention of criticism.
Still, note my qualifier-I use the term "perhaps," and I do so
intentionally. All of my examples speculate on what the local prop-
erty rules might be. Thus, at the end, I am back at the beginning. I
suppose that I am something of a formalist, or at least a positivist, in
these matters, although these are terms that at Yale and perhaps else-
where are nowadays considered pejorative. But there are reasons for
my caution. It often is useful for courts to work out what customs
and practices have evolved to govern property in particular local situ-
ations, and maybe, as Epstein suggests, they should even be bound by
what they discover. As I said before, however, I am suspicious of
judicial forays into anthropology, and I am reluctant to concede that
adjudication is the right forum for building up thick descriptions of
industry. I am worried, in short, about whether courts really have the
capacity to tell us what makes Petrushevsky's watch tick-or whether
their best expertise is simply in noting, with Pushkin, that the wheels
have stopped going round.
35 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18
. Legal Stud. 325, 358-59 (1989).
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